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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4), which provides as follows:
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the
Court of Appeals any of the matters over which
the Supreme Court has original appellate
jurisdiction.
The supreme court had original jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITIES
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The standard of review with respect to issues 1,2,3 and 7 in
this case is as follows:
After the marshalling all of the evidence
which supports the decision of the court on
the respective issues heretofore set forth, is
there any competent evidence upon which to
base the decisions of the trial court? If so,
the appellate court must affirm the decision
of the lower court; and if not, the appellate
court must reverse the trial court's decision
and direct it to enter judgement in favor of
the defendant.
A trial courts findings of fact are
clearly erroneous if they are so lacking in
support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence.
Despite the evidence, were the trial
court's findings so lacking in support as to
be against the clear weight of evidence, thus
making them clearly erroneous.
The standard of review with respect to issues 4, 5 and 6 in
this case is as follows:
1

The appellate court accords no particular
deference to conclusions of law but rather
reviews them for correctness.
Berube v.
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1039
(Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068. 1070 (Utah 1985); Utah R.Civ.P.52(c).
B.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ISSUE 1.

Malice.

Was the Court's ruling erroneous and

against the clear weight of the evidence since there was no
competent evidence of malice upon which to base a judgment against
the defendant for attorneys fees?
Standard of Review:
A trial courts findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they
are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence.

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989);

Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1147.
Findings are clearly erroneous if they are against the clear
weight of evidence or if the appellate court reaches (a) definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Edwards &

Daniels Architects, Inc. v. Farmers' Properties, Inc., 865 P.2d
1382, 1385 (Utah App. 1993).
Despite the evidence, were the trial court's findings so
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence,
thus making them clearly erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic
Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991).
ISSUE 2.

Survey.

Was the Court's ruling erroneous and

against the weight of the evidence since there was no competent
evidence to show that Plaintiff's survey was correct in that it was
not

done

in

accordance

with

standard
2

survey

procedure

and

Defendant's survey was done in accordance with standard survey
rules and this survey evidence showed that Defendant was the owner
of the property at issue?
Standard of Review:
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for
Issue 1.
ISSUE 3. Acquiescence. Was the Court's ruling erroneous and
against the weight of the evidence since the Defendant proved the
elements of boundary by acquiescence and there was no competent
evidence introduced to refute this proof?
Standard of Review:
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for
Issue 1.
ISSUE 4. Evidence Of Value. Did the Court err in refusing to
admit evidence of value of the disputed property?
Standard of Review:
The

appellate

court accords

no particular

deference to

conclusions of law but rather reviews them for correctness. Berube
v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1039 (Utah 1989); Scharf v.
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068. 1070 (Utah 1985); Utah R.Civ.P.52(c).
ISSUE 5.

Offset.

Did the Court err in refusing to admit

evidence of amounts paid in settlement by the Title Company?

Is

Defendant entitled to an offset for these amounts?
Standard of Review:
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for
Issue 4.
3

ISSUE 6.

Adverse Possession.

Did the Court err in refusing

to admit Defendant's evidence of adverse possession?
Standard of Review:
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for
Issue 4.
ISSUE 7.
Defendant

prove

Slander Of Title On The Counterclaim.
the

elements

of

slander

of

title

Did the
on

its

counterclaim and was there competent evidence introduced to refute
this proof?
Standard of Review:
The Standard of Review is the same as set forth above for
Issue 1.
III.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION
IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE CASE
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-7.1 provides as follows:
Adverse possession - Presumption - Provisio
- Tax title.
In every action for the recovery or
possession of real property or to quiet title
to or determine the owner thereof the person
establishing a legal title to such property
shall be presumed to have been possessed
thereof within the time required by law; and
the occupation of such property by any other
person shall be deemed to have been under and
in subordination to the legal title, unless it
appears that such property has been held and
possessed adversely to such legal title for
seven years before the commencement of such
action.
Provided, however, that if in any
action any party shall establish prima facie
evidence that he is the owner of any real
property under a tax title held by him and his
predecessors for four years prior to the
4

commencement of such action and one year after
the effective date of this amendment he shall
be presumed to be the owner of such property
by adverse possession unless it appears that
the owner of the legal title or his
predecessor has actually occupied or been in
possession of such property under such title
or that such tax title owner and his
predecessors have failed to pay all the taxes
levied or assessed upon such property within
such four-year period.
The Professional Rules of Survey Standards, Rule defining
ranking of calls provides as follows:
Ranking of calls is based upon the rules
of evidence and is commonly broadened to
assist in interpretation of all forms of
descriptions and boundary recover. The most
common hierarchy of calls is as follows:
1. Natural monuments;
2. artificial monuments;
3. distances;
4. directions; and
5. area.
Any element of a description of a parcel
may be rejected or overruled, based upon a
review of the best evidence available. The
courts have usually held that the most
important and overriding factor in the
interpretation of property descriptions is the
intent of the parties. All of the words of a
deed are to be considered so that evidence
that best demonstrates the intention of the
buyer and seller will prevail, in most cases.
With this in mind, the writer of a metes and
bounds description should ensure that the
intention of the parties is clearly expressed.
. . .A poor measurement to the correct
corner is much superior to a precise
measurement to a false corner.
In real
property boundaries, it is the physical
location of the corners that is important.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE.

This

case involves a boundary

line dispute between two

neighbors regarding the ownership of 11,777 square feet of property
adjoining

Old

Ranch

Road, which

runs

north

and

south

near

Snyderville, Utah. The Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors own property
on the east side of the road, and the Defendant Appellant Cummings
owns property on the west side of the road.

The Plaintiffs

Appellees Gillmors claim that they own a small strip of land on the
west side of the road. Both the Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' and
Defendant Appellant Cummings' surveys go to Ranch Road, but the
Plaintiff/Appellees Gillmors claim that a small portion of Old
Ranch Road was moved to the east, leaving part of their land on the
west side of the road adjacent to Cummings' property.

Cummings

denied the road moved, but claims even if it did, he has since
acquired title to the property by boundary line by acquiescence and
adverse possession.
Defendant Appellant Cummings subdivided his property including
the disputed strip and sold lots upon which homes were built. The
remaining Defendants Garlick, Pelton, Haren and Wohlford owned lots
which

the Plaintiffs

Appellees

Gillmors

disputed strip within these boundaries.

claim

include

their

Homes were build upon

these lots and the homeowners title insurance policies were issued
to these lot owners.

The Title Company settled with Plaintiffs

Appellees Gillmors prior to trial by paying them $45,000 for title
6

to the disputed strip and to settle all claims against these
homeowners asserted by Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors.

The only

issue left for trial after the settlement was claimed by Plaintiffs
Appellees

Gillmors

against

Defendant

Appellant

Cummings

for

attorneys fees expended in the prosecution of this litigation.
Defendant Appellant Cummings counterclaimed for slander of
title on adjoining property.

The disputed strip is illustrated by

the following diagram:

(sec

eM-n^ *2.

o
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B.

THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER

COURT.
Trial was held on August 10, 1993 in the Third District Court
of Summit County, Coalville, Utah. After the Plaintiffs Appellees
Gillmors had rested and in light of the fact that in the view of
Defendant/Appellant Cummings the Plaintiff had not proven damages
as to attorneys fees, the Defendant/Appellant elected to rest. A
Judgement and Decree of Quiet Title was entered on November 23,
1993 with a provision that allowed the Plaintiffs to reopen their
case to prove their damages as to attorneys fees.
Defendant Appellant Cummings moved the court for a new trial
or in the alternative to reopen the trial to allow him to refute
the attorneys fees and Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' general
allegations. Judge Wilkinson denied the motion for a new trial but
allowed the trial to be reopened to allow the Plaintiffs to
establish attorneys fees and also to allow Defendant Appellant
Cummings to present his case in defense.
Further trial proceedings were held on February 16 and 17,
1994 with the closing arguments on February 24, 1994. The Amended
Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title was entered by the clerk of the
Summit County Court on May 10, 1994 awarding Plaintiffs Appellees
Gillmors damages for attorneys fees in the amount of $52,563.54.
It is from this judgment that Defendant Appellant Cummings is now
appealing.
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C.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

1.

The deeds introduced into evidence at the trial are set

forth in the following title drain as follows:
Charles R. Spencer
Was the common owner of the entire parcel
which was broken up into two parcels.
The dispute arises out of the division
line of the two properties.
Warranty Deed dated 10/25/26
Plaintiff's Exhibit #r

Stephen T. Gillmor
Died April 21, 1933
Defendant's Exhibit #1
Decree of Distribution
dated October 19, 1934
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1
Decree of Distribution

Warranty Deed dated 10/30/30
Defendant's Exhibit #23

Emil Marcellin and
Bernice Marcellin
Warranty Deed
Dated September 7, 1961
Plaintiff's Exhibit #19

De fendant/Appe11ant
Veigh Cummings

Alva J. Gillmor

Stephen T. Gillmor, Jr.

Margaret May Gillmor

Contract of Sale
Deed of Bargain and Sale
Dated March 6, 1936
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1

1/2 Charles F. Gillmor, Sr

V

1/2 Edward L. Gillmor
("The Older")

Warranty Deed
Dated May 15, 1953
Plaintiff's Exhibit #:
1/4
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr,

*\j/

Decree of Distribution
Dated 09/03/71
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1

1/4
Edward L. Gillmor
("Bud")

Warranty Deed
Dated Fe:fyruary 26, 1988
Plaintif s Exhibit #1

1/4

1/2
Florence Gillmor

Title by partition degrees
Dated February 14, 1981
Plaintiff's Exhibit #1

3/4
Plaintiffs/Appellees
Charles F. Gillmor. Jr, and Nadine Gillmor
2. The deeds in the title drain emanate from common grantors,
Charles R. Spencer and Isabelle Spencer, The first two deeds were
given to Stephen T. Gillmor on October 25, 1926 and the second deed
was given to Emil Marcellin in 1931.

The description contained in

the deed to Marcellin was all the rest of the property owned by
Charles R. Spencer less that portion already deeded to Stephen T.
Gillmor.

The two separate parcels at that point had a common

boundary legal description and the only factual issue is where that
legal description fell on the ground.
3.

A dispute of facts was erroneously injected into the case

by virtue of a partition decree entered into, to settle litigation
between Edward L. Gillmor and Siv Gillmor, his wife V. Florence
Gillmor, Charles F. Gillmor (one of the plaintiffs in this action)
and Melba Gillmor his wife, Civil No. 223998 Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Plaintiff's Exhibit #1).

Charles

F. Gillmor is now married to Nadine Gillmor, the other plaintiff
herein.

A new legal description was generated for the purpose of
10

that decree that differed from the descriptions used by Charles R.
Spencer when he divided the property originally

(R001372 and

Exhibit #1). The boundary line between the disputed properties was
described differently in the partition decree than it was in the
Charles R. Spencer deeds dated:
(a) October 25, 1926, and
(b) October 30, 1930.
The deeds from Charles R. Spencer to Stephen T. Gillmor and
Bernice Marcellin used the following boundary line description to
define the boundary line between the two parcels of property:
...thence West approximately 5 rods to a point on
the Easterly side of the aforesaid 6 rod wide road and at
a point 3 rods Easterly from the center line of said road
and at right angles thereto; thence along the Easterly
side of said road and 3 rods Easterly from the center
line thereof and at right angles thereto, Northerly and
Westerly to a point 3 rods East from the Southwest corner
to the Northwest Quarter of Section 28, aforesaid; thence
West 3 rods; thence Northwesterly on a direct line 61
rods, more or less, to the point of beginning. (Emphasis
added) (Plaintiff's Exhibit #1).
The description generated for the partition decree is set
forth as follows as it pertains to the dividing line between the
two properties.
. . .thence southeasterly 1006.50 feet more or less to
the west quarter corner of said section 28, thence east
49.50 feet, thence southeasterly along a road to a point
that is 82.50 feet west of the point of beginning thence
east 82.50 feet to the point of beginning. (Emphasis
added)
4.

The deeds from Spencer to Gillmor and from Spencer to

Marcellin have one point of beginning and the partition decree has
a different point of beginning.
property

by

using

a

The Spencer deeds describe the

clockwise boundary
11

description

and

the

partition decree described the property using a counterclockwise
boundary description.
5.

The reason so many of the facts relied upon herein are

cited to Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 is because it was a many paged
exhibit containing all of the title documents in Plaintiff's chain
of title.
6.

Emil Marcellin told Defendant Appellant Cummings that

Veigh Cummings and his co-owner owned the property west of the
county road.

This included the disputed strip of property (R1497

and Pelton testimony).
7. The partition decree description did not close by at least
200 feet (R 1764, 1765, 1412).
8.

The survey of the partition decree description used a

distance call in preference to a call to a monument. The survey of
Kent Wilde who testified at the trial that the Spencer deed
description went to the road relied on the call to the monument
rather than the distance call.
9.

Defendant Appellant Cummings occupied the property since

1961 and at no time during his occupancy did anyone dispute his
ownership (R 001587).

12

V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE ONE
MALICE
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE CLEAR
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF
MALICE UPON WHICH TO BASE A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES.
The clear and convincing evidence at trial showed Defendant
Appellant Cummings bore no malice and demonstrated none in his
actions with respect to the property.

He relied on his deeds in

the chain of title, all of which tied his east line description to
"Old Ranch Road".

Defendant Appellant Cummings and his co-owner,

Al Pelton, from whom Defendant/Appellant Cummings later purchased
the remaining 1/2 interest in the property, were both told by Emil
Marcellin that they owned all of the property west of the "Road".
No one had questioned or challenged Defendant Appellant Cummings'
possession of all of the property west of the "Road" from 1961 when
he purchased it until this action was commenced on October 15,
1987.
B.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE TWO
SURVEY
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF'S SURVEY WAS CORRECT IN THAT IT WAS NOT DONE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD SURVEY PROCEDURE AND DEFENDANT'S SURVEY
WAS DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARD SURVEY RULES AND THIS SURVEY
EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY AT
ISSUE.
13

Kent Wilde, a civil engineer and licensed surveyor, surveyed
the boundary line description as it was set forth in both Defendant
Appellant Cummings' and Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' description
acquisition deeds.

He testified that his survey ran along the

existing road and that, therefore, all of the property west of the
road was within Defendant Appellant Cummings' legal description and
outside of Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' legal description. James
West, Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors' surveyor testified to the
contrary, but his survey was fatally flawed for the following
reasons:
(1)

He used the partition decree's boundary line which was

outside of the chain of title.
(2) There was a discrepancy between a call to a monument and
the distance to that monument.

He used the distance call by

mistake because the Rules of Surveying require that in that
situation, one must use the monument, which was the road, and had
he done so, his survey would have been consistent with Kent
Wilde's.
(3)

His survey did not close by more than 200 feet.

For each and all of these reasons, his survey must be
rejected.
C.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE THREE
ACQUIESCENCE
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT PROVED THE ELEMENTS OF
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AND THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE
INTRODUCED TO REFUTE THIS PROOF.
14

Laborious attempts to marshal1 the evidence contrary to
boundary line by acquiescence have revealed that there is no such
evidence and Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors should be required to
refute this from the record if they can.
The evidence shows that Defendant Appellant Cumminqs fenced
the property in dispute and occupied it without complaint or
interference for 23 years which qives him title by acquiescence to
the disputed strip.
D.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE FOUR
EVIDENCE OF VALUE
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF THE
DISPUTED PROPERTY.
The Trial Court erred when it declined to admit Dale Jackman's
appraisal or his testimony of the value of the land in dispute.
Attorneys fees should bear some reasonable relationship to the
primary amount in dispute. Dale Jackman's proffered testimony was
that the disputed strip had a value of $7,000.00. This testimony
was relevant for two purposes:
(1) To show that an award of attorneys fees in the amount of
$52,000.00 was excessive in view of the small amount of value in
the disputed property.
(2)

That figure should have been

subtracted

from the

$45,000.00 which the Title Company paid as the reasonable portion
to quiet title to the property and the balance of $38,000.00 should
be credited to the attorneys fees judgment.
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E.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE FIVE
OFFSET
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF AMOUNTS PAID
IN SETTLEMENT BY THE TITLE COMPANY. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN
OFFSET FOR THESE AMOUNTS.
The Trial Court erred when it declined to admit evidence of
amounts paid in settlement to Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors by the
Title Company and ruled that said amounts could not be used as an
offset for attorneys fees awarded at trial after credit was given
for the fair market value of the property.

By not crediting the

settlement amounts, Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors would receive
double compensation and Defendant Appellant Cummings would be
vulnerable to double damages in further litigation by the Title
Company in Civil No. 940300009 to seek reimbursement for the
settlement which they made.
F.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE SIX
ADVERSE POSSESSION
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE OF
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The Trial Court erred when it declined to admit Defendant
Appellant Cummings' evidence on adverse possession which would have
demonstrated that from 1961 until 1987, Cummings and his successors
paid all of the property taxes on the property and thus would have
been

entitled

to receive

judgment on the theory

of Adverse

Possession as provided in the statute. The Court by doing so ruled
as a matter of law that the Defendant Appellant Cummings was not
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entitled to assert a claim for adverse possession and this was a
question of fact to be tried at the trial on its merits.
G.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE SEVEN
SLANDER OF TITLE ON THE COUNTERCLAIM
THE DEFENDANT PROVED THE ELEMENTS OF SLANDER OF TITLE ON ITS
COUNTERCLAIM AND THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED TO
REFUTE THIS PROOF.
The

evidence

and

testimony

at

trial

demonstrated

that

Defendant Appellant Cummings' title to his property was slandered
when Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors recorded the survey map in 1987
followed by the filing of a lis pendens which frustrated a proposed
sale that was pending on the property.

Cummings is entitled to

judgment against Plaintiff/Appellees Gillmors for Slander of Title.
VI.
ARGUMENT
A.
MALICE
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE CLEAR
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF
MALICE UPON WHICH TO BASE A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR
ATTORNEYS FEES.
Utah law does not allow an award of attorneys fees in a quiet
title action unless they can be based upon one of the following
grounds:
(1) Malice on the part of the defendant.
(2)

A showing of bad faith prosecution of the litigation

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
(3) A contractual provision allowing such an award.
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The evidence does not show nor do the Plaintiffs Appellees
Gillmors contend that there is either bad faith or a contractual
provision upon which to claim attorneys fees. Therefore, in order
to prevail on this issue, the Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors must
show malice.
Two legal issues should now be considered in connection with
the malice question:
(1)

What standard must be met under Utah law to establish

malice in a quiet title action?
(2) How does this standard distinguish between those cases in
which an award of attorneys fees is appropriate and those cases
which are routine quiet title actions where an award of attorneys
fees would be inappropriate?
Attorneys fees have been held to be recoverable as special
damages if incurred to remove a cloud placed by the defendant on
the title if the elements of a slander of title action have been
proven.

See Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 89 Utah

Advanced Reports 11, Utah 1988, Dowse v. Doris Trust, 116 Utah 111,
208 P.2d 958, Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Keller, 490 F.2d 545, 549
(10th Cir 1974).
In order to qualify for a recovery of attorneys fees, the
elements of a slander of title action must be proven.
These elements are set forth as follows:
First, there must be a publication, either oral or written, of
a slanderous statement.

A slanderous statement is one that is

derogatory or injurious to the legal validity of an owner's title
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or his or her right to sell or hypothecate the property; second,
the statement must be false; third, the statement must have been
made with malice; and, fourth, the statement must cause actual or
special damages to the plaintiff. See Jack B. Parsons Companies v.
Nield, 751 P.2d 1131, 1134 (utah 1988); Dowse v. Doris Trust Co,
116 Utah 106, 110-11, 208 P.2d 956, 958 (1949). See also McNichols
v. Coneios-K Corp., 29 Colo.App. 205, 209, 482 P.2d 432, 434
(1971); Cardon v. McConnell, 120 N.C. 461, 27 S.E. 109 (1897). See
generally 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander §541 (1970).
The court stated in Bass supra, at 12:
There are no general or presumed damages in slander
of title actions. Special damages are ordinarily proved
in a slander of title action by evidence of a lost sale
or the loss of some other pecuniary advantage.
The court stated in Bass, that one of the reasons Bass could
not recover an award for damages for slander of title was...
Plaintiffs produced none of the prospective buyers
at trial, and there was no evidence of any lost sales.
See Bass supra at page 12.
In the instant case, the Gillmors settled their case prior to
trial with the parties to whom Veigh Cummings had sold the
property.

Any attorneys fees incurred after that date were not

incurred in an effort to clear title and should not be awarded. In
fact, no attorneys fees whatever should be awarded because no lost
sale was proven which was a threshold requirement which had to be
met before any attorneys fees at all could be awarded.
It now becomes the duty of Defendant Appellant Cummings to
marshall the evidence by listing all of the evidence supporting the
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finding on malice which is now being challenged and to demonstrate
that all of such evidence taken together was against the clear
weight of the evidence and, therefore, the lower court's ruling was
clearly erroneous. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286
(Utah 1993); Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991);
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990); Grayson Roper
Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co. , 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989); In re Estate of
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); In re Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d
971, 977 (Utah App. 1994); Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 551 n.2
(Utah App. 1993); Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah App.
1993); Robb, 863 P.2d at 1327; Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton,
863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 972
(Utah App. 1993); Gray, 851 P.2d at 1225; King v. Industrial
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Johnson v. Board of
Review, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Peterson. 841
P.2d 21, 25 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 471
(Utah App. 1991).
The Defendant Appellant herewith marshals the evidence in
support of a finding of malice and submits the following:
Mr. Kinghorn evaluated the elements of malice and read from
the Parley Neeley deposition as follows: (R. 001540 - R. 001545)
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The third element is malice. Under the cases,
malice need not be shown as actual malice. It
need only be shown by the doing of a willful
or reckless act in disregard in the rights of
others. That's where Mr. Neeley's testimony
becomes interesting.
It's also interesting that Mr. Cummings
has testified, I think inconsistent with the
testimony of Mr. Neeley, and what I would like
to do is point out to the court the testimony
of Mr. Neeley who is a man who prepared the
legal descriptions which were used in the
deeds that Mr. Cummings signed that slandered
our title.
Mr. Neeley prepared I believe exhibit no.
21, the two drawings of the Treasure Mountain
Estates, and in his testimony, this is what he
says about what he was instructed to do to
prepare his survey.
In response to a
Question—
The Court: Where are you?
Mr. Kinghorn: I'm going to start at page
8 your honor, the statement of Parley Neeley,
which is page 8, line 20. I said:
Q. Mr. Neeley, did you go out to the area of
the survey and physically conduct a survey of
the property?
A. I believe so, yes. I have been out there,
and I believe I was there when a survey was
done.
Q. Did you go out there with your client to
do the survey work?
A.
I didn't go out with Jackson Howard, I
went out with someone else it was one of two.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. I don't know whether it was Elrod Starley
or Veigh Cummings, but one of those two. I
think it was Veigh Cummings.
Q. Do you recall where you met Mr. Cummings
when you started this survey work?
A.
If I remember right, I met him at the
Newhouse Hotel and he came up to Snyderville
where the survey was conducted. I went with
him.
Q. Tell me what happened when you went up
there with Mr. Cummings.
How were you
instructed to perform the worked that you
preformed and tell us what you did.
I was asking Mr. Neeley, if you turn back
to page 5 and page 6 and 7, I was asking him
specifically about legal descriptions that are
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on the drawing which is exhibit no. 21. In
response to my guestion about how he was
instructed to perform the survey and what he
did, he said.
The Court: Where are you now?
Mr. Kinghorn: Page 90. Line 20. He said:
There were fences surrounding the property on
all sides. There was a road on the east side
and a road on the south side, But there was
fence along that county road. However, I was
told to go the center of the middle of this
road.
Q. Who gave you those instructions?
A. Whoever I went with. I think it was Mr.
Cummings.
Q.
Did he show you corners and boundaries
that he wanted you to survey?
A. I don't know that we physically walked out
to them, but standing in various places, they
were pointed out.
Q. Did he indicate to you that was the extent
of the property he owned?
A.
Indicated that was the extent of the
property we were to do our work on.
Q. Were you ever furnished a copy of a deed
and asked to survey the description on the
deed in connection with this work, Mr. Neeley?
A. I have looked through the folder here, and
I see no evidence of descriptions or deeds. I
think that's indicative of why we call this a
"Post Survey."
(Mr. Kinghorn) I asked him:
Q. What do you mean by "Post Survey"?
A. That's language used on the exhibit, "Post
Survey." We use it in our office as the area
that's being posted by the owner or the
owners, outlined by the physical monuments,
natural or artificial. In this case it would
be artificial.
There are wooden fences and roads.
Mr. Kinghorn: What's clear from the testimony
of Mr. Neeley, and he also goes on to tell
about how he did perimeter descriptions and he
calculated descriptions for lots, but what's
important about Mr. Neeley's testimony, your
honor, is that it's clear Mr. Cummings, first
of all, he has a deed from Mr. Marcellin, and
he has taken title to property under legal
description in that deed, and in fact his
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partner Mr. Pelton had used that identical
legal description in conveying property back
to him in 1965, which is the same year this
survey was done.
Mr. Cummings had access to that deed.
Mr. Cummings had that deed, obviously, in his
transaction with Mr. Pelton, but he didn't use
that deed. Then he instructed Mr. Neeley to
go out and perform the survey. Instead, he
took him out there and had him survey
something
entirely
different
than
the
description on the deed. What happens to the
property that's in dispute here, Mr. Cummings
wasn't careful, and that's the kind of
willfulness and recklessness that our court's
recognize as implied malice.
The second position I would point to as
evidence of implied malice here is the
inconsistent statements he made to Frank
Marcellin the other day. This just came out
in the course of my interview with Mr.
Marcellin. I asked him if he ever talked to
Mr. Cummings about this, and he said, "Well,
the other day he said this to me about why he
thought owned property. He just assumed he
owned it."
He never told Mr. Marcellin, "Frank, your
dad told me I owned this property." He didn't
come out and tell that to Mr. Marcellin.
That's his testimony in court today.
But that's now what he told Frank two or
three days ago when they were eyeball to
eyeball out on the property and talking about
the exact area in dispute. That's evidence of
an inconsistent statement by Mr. Cummings and
is also further evidence of malice, that he
has knowledge of what he did, he knows what he
did under these circumstances.
What Mr. Marcellin testified to as to the meeting with Mr. Cummings
is as follows:

(R. 001526 - R. 001530)

Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) During this past week, did
you have occasion to meet with veigh Cummings
on his property that's in dispute in this
case?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Tell us why you were there, what you were
doing.
A. I took him and his attorneys out to the
23

place in question, showed them where the eastwest property line was, took Mr. Cummings'
attorney down off the bottom of the hill and
showed him where our property line ran north
to south, and then came back up and was up
there. And I told Veigh, I says, "I always
though you bought this piece of property from
the Gillmors."
Q. What piece of property were you referring
to?
A.
That piece of property that's—That's
where Al Pelton and the Garlick home is,
that's to the west of the now-present Old
Ranch Road.
Q. Let me refer you to the exhibit that we
have marked and which you've testified from
before. Let me refer you to sheet no. 2 of
Exhibit No. 2, and I'll ask: Does this sheet
depict the property you were asking Mr.
Cummings about?
A. Yes.
Q. When did this conversation take place?
A. I believe it was last Friday, and it was
somewhere about 10:30, 11:00 o'clock in the
morning.
Q. Who was present besides you and — .
A.
Veigh Cummings, his attorney and the
gentleman in back with the tie on, and the
lady to the right with the glasses on.
Q. Did you ask Mr. Cummings some questions
about this ownership?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Tell us what you said and what he said.
A. I asked him, "I always though you bought
this property from Gillmors," Because I told
him where our property line was, and our dad
always showed us where that property line
went.
Mr. Summerhays: objection to what his
father told him.
The Court: I'll sustain as to what his
father told him; I'll overrule as to what he
saw, what he saw his father do, where his
father walked on the property line.
Mr. Summerhays:
Move to strike those
portions of what—
The Court: I would grant that.
Mr. Kinghorn: Thank you. did you take
Mr. Cummings down to the area that you have
generally as this black line you initialled
here on sheet 2 of exhibit 2?
A. I did not.
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Q. You did not take Mr. Cummings down there?
A. I did not.
Q.
Did you go down there with any of the
others?
A. Mr. Suiranerhays
Q.
Where did this conversation with Mr.
Cummings occur? Where was he when you had
that conversation?
A. We came back up to the road, and I—when I
asked him if he hadn't bought it from Frank,
he "I assume I owned it" I said, "What do you
mean you assumed you owned t? Who told you
owned it." And he never answered me, just
left it.
Q.
Did he tell you at the time that your
father had told him he owned it?
A. He did not?
Q. Did he make any statement to you or any
indication to you that he had received
information from your father that he owned
this triangular piece of property that's in
dispute?
A. He did not.
Q.
What was the statement he made to you
about his ownership of the property?
Mr. Summerhays: Objection, repetitious,
he's said it once. It's his witness.
Mr. Kinghorn: I want to make it clear
that he said it in report of the conversation.
The Court: I'll allow the question.
Q. What was the statement he made to you when
you asked him who told him he owned the
property?
A. Well, he assumed.
Q. He assumed that he owned it?
A. Yes.
The foregoing is against the clear weight of the evidence
which is set forth as follows:
Mr. Cummings testified :

(R. 001519 - R. 001520)

Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) When you had Mr. Neeley
prepare this survey of your property, did you
know that you were defining the boundary
between yourself, your property, and the
Gillmor property?
A. That I was defining it?
Q. Yes, when you had Mr. Neeley survey this.
A. Yes.
Q.
You took him out there and showed him
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around the property, and showed him where you
thought the boundaries were?
A. Yes, and we verified it I think with the
legal descriptions that were given to him.
Q. We don't know today what Mr. Neeley did
other than what's in his testimony, do we?
A. I haven't recalled his testimony.
Q.
So anything you might say about him
verifying things is just speculation on your
part; is that correct?
A. I know him or Jackson Howard.
Q.
When you had Mr. Neeley survey the
property, did you make any attempt to contact
any member of the Gillmor Family and say,
"here is where I think the boundary is, do you
folks agree to that?"
A. No. Why would I do that?
Q. You took no steps when you were going on
to a different legal description, you took no
steps to contact you neighbors and find o u t —
A. No.
Q.
If the descriptions were consistent?
A. No. I had had the property for years, and
I knew where my boundaries were.
(R. 001498 - R. 001500)
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Prior to time you received
exhibit no. 19 from Mr. Marcellin and his
wife, do you recall whether or not you saw a
legal description of the property you were
going to buy?
A. No, I don't think I did.
Q. Was this deed the first legal description
you saw for the Marcellin property you were
purchasing?
A. Probably.
Q. After you received this deed, did you take
it and go out in the field and try to locate
any of the boundaries that are shown in this
deed?
A.
No, not at the time.
Q. Did you ever hand this deed to a surveyor
and say, would you please go out in the field,
Mr. Surveyor, and mark the boundaries of this
deed, "Prior to the commencement of this case?
A. I think we gave a tax notice and the deed
to Pat Neeley, yes.
Q. Do you think you did?
A.
Yes, I know we gave him some legal
descriptions; whether it was a deed or a tax
notice or which we did give him there were
some descriptions of the property.
Q. Are you prepared to testify today that you
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gave this deed to Pat Neeley and asked him to
go out and survey the boundaries of this
property?
A. No.
Q.
I'll show you what's been marked as
Exhibit no. 20.
Can you identify this
document for us, Mr. Cummings?
A. It was a Quit Claim deed when I bought Al
Pelton's interest in the ranch out.
Q.
That was in April of 1965; is that
correct?
A. Yes.
(R. 1505 - R. 1507)
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Drawing no. 5765, that's a
drawing that was prepared for you by Parley
Neeley?
A. (Mr. Cummings) Yes.
Q. Of what is called Treasure Mountain?
A. Ranches.
Q.
Treasure Mountain Ranches, is this the
subdivision that you were telling us about a
moment ago that you and attorneys from Provo
were planning to develop together?
A. Jackson Howard, yes
Q. Were you present when Mr. Neeley conducted
the survey from which this drawing comes?
A. Oh, I was up there at times when they were
working, but no, I wasn't there all the time;
but yes, I was up there while they were
working.
Q. Did you show Mr. Neeley the boundaries of
the property you claimed so he could prepare
this survey?
A. I"m sure I rode around the road and showed
him what we had bought and everything.
Q. You took him around and showed him where
you wanted him to survey the line for the
development that you and Mr. Howard and Mr.
Lewis were going to develop?
A.
Yes, I showed him the ground we had
bought, yes.
Q. And do you remember meeting with him down
at the Old Hotel Newhouse and going up the
property to take him around the property
boundary
A. Possibly so, It seems like I could have
met him up there, yes.
Q. After this drawing was prepared, did you
have a chance to examine it? Did you look at
it?
A. Sure.
Q. Did you compare the legal description of
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the boundaries of this survey with the legal
description of the deeds you had received from
Mr. and Mrs. Marcellin?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. You never did that?
A. No, I don't know that I'd be qualified to
do that' but no, I didn't that I recall
anyway.
Q.
The legal descriptions that appear on
Exhibit nos. 7 and 8 call the legal
descriptions that were performed by Mr. Neeley
after he did—
A. Yes.
Q.
— the survey that's reflected on this
drawing no. 57 65?
A. Yes.
Q.
Is that where these legal descriptions
came from right off
A. I think so; yes, I think that's right.
Q. So after you had Mr. neeley prepare this
new survey of the property, the survey that's
shown on exhibit no. 21, You used those legal
descriptions whenever you conveyed property
out to buyers.?
A. This legal description is in here, yes,
those are attached to the plat.
(R. 1508)
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Are you the one that was
responsible for taking Mr. Neeley up to the
property and showing him the boundaries that
you wanted surveyed for development?
A. (Mr. Cummings) Jackson Howard, Rex Lewis
and myself, and Pat Neeley, were there on more
than one occasion together.
Q.
So is it your testimony that Jackson
Howard and Mr. Lewis are responsible for the
boundary description on this property?
A. Well, I assumed so; they sure they knew where the property line was, and
they sure—they did.
Q.
Had they ever been up there with Mr.
Marcellin to look at the property before you
purchased it from him?
A. I don't Know.
Q. They were interested in the property back
when you purchased it from Mr. Marcellin, were
they
A. I don't know. I don't think so. I don't
know.
Q.
You had no contact with them when Mr.
Pelton purchased it?
A. No.
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Q. They would have no reason to visit with
Mr. Marcellin about boundaries, would they?
A. I don't think so.
Q.
They wouldn't have any basis of any
knowledge to take anybody out there and say,
"Here's the boundaries of this farm"?
A. Well, they—this legal description, and
the fact is Jackson gave legal descriptions
and that to Mr. Neeley.
Q. How do you know he was there?
A. Because I was there. I don't know whether
it was tax notices or the legal descriptions
off the vdeed, but it was legal descriptions,
tax notices or deeds.
Q. What did you see him give Mr. Neeley? Was
there a piece of paper with writing on it?
A. I think it was tax notices.
Q. You think it was tax notices?
A. I think so.
Q. Did you read the piece of paper that Mr.
Howard gave to Mr. Neeley?
A. I think I gave the piece of paper to Mr.
Jackson Howard that he gave to Mr. Neeley.
Q. Did you read it?
A. Yes, I'm sure that is was tax notices. I
think it was tax notices on the ranch.
Q. But it wasn't a deed?
A. Not that I recall, I'm not sure. Maybe we
gave them both.
Q. You don't remember today which of the two?
A. No, I think we may have given them both,
but I'm quite sure we gave them tax notices.
(R. 35)
Q.
(Mr. Summerhays)
When you asked Mr.
Neeley to survey this property, did you give
him any instructions about how to do it?
A. (Mr. Cummings) Well, we took him around
the road and showed him where the boundaries
were on the road, and naturally we gave him
some tax notices or the legal descriptions we
got from Marcellin. Some attorneys from Provo
were involved with me in that development and
they were the ones that contacted Mr. Neeley
on the first instance, and the paperwork and
the deal was made in Howard Jackson's office
in Provo.
Q. Jackson Howard?
A. Jackson Howard, yes, sir.
Q. And did he assist you in determining where
those boundary lines were, in his opinion?
A. Oh, yes. He and Rex Lewis were partners
with me and they had much more knowledge in
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the legal matters than I did.
Q. And did you get a legal opinion from them
that your title went to the road?
A. Oh, yes. absolutely.
Q. And did you, in good faith, rely on that?
A. Yes.
Mr. Neely in effect said he did not know whether he had
received a legal description or not, but didn't think so because
there were none in his file at the time of the file.

Defendant

Appellant Cummings stated repeatedly that Mr. Neely was provided
with tax notices as legal descriptions.

Defendant Appellant

Cummings' testimony clearly is dispositive by its decisive weight,
but under either scenario, there was no malice in view of the fact
that it was undisputed that Defendant Appellant Cummings relied on
good faith by legal opinions of his counsel that his property lied
up to the road.

Defendant Appellant Cummings relied on Emil

Marcellin showing and telling him he owned everything west of the
road (R. 32, 001521, 001497) and also Emil Marcellin had told Al
Pelton the same thing that the property was of the road was what he
was selling (R.

18). No one disputed this testimony that Emil

Marcellin didn't tell and show both Veigh Cummings and Al Pelton
the property was all that west of the road was what they were
purchasing. So when Frank Marcellin asked whether he had purchased
the property from Gillmors and relying upon what Frank's father
Emil had told both himself and Al Pelton the reply to Frank of "I
assumed I owned it" is reasonable and certainly does not reflect
any degree of malice, implied or otherwise.
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B.
SURVEY
THE COURT'S RULING HAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE
HEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE HAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SHOH THAT PLAINTIFF'S SURVEY HAS CORRECT IN THAT IT HAS NOT DONE IN
ACCORDANCE HITH STANDARD SURVEY PROCEDURE AND DEFENDANT'S SURVEY
HAS DONE IN ACCORDANCE HITH STANDARD SURVEY RULES AND THIS SURVEY
EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT DEFENDANT HAS THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY AT
ISSUE.
Marshalling the evidence shows that the acquisition deed
description

both defines

the boundary

as

corresponding with

Cummings' existing road and requires that title be quieted in
Defendant Appellant Cummings.

James West, Plaintiffs Appellees

Gillmors' surveyor testified to the contrary, but his survey was
fatally flawed for the following reasons:
(1)

He used the partition decree's boundary line which was

outside of the chain of title.
(2) There was a discrepancy between a call to a monument and
the distance to the monument. He used the distance call by mistake
because the Rules of Surveying require that in that situation, one
must use the monument, which was the road, and had he done so, his
survey would have been consistent with Kent Wilde's
(3) His survey did not close by more than 200 feet.
For each and all of these reasons, his survey must be
rejected.
The Defendant Appellant herewith marshals the evidence in
support of a finding that the survey by James West is the correct
interpretation of the historical deeds and therefore it was correct
to Quiet Title in the Plaintiffs.
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The historical deeds emanate from a common grantor Charles R.
and Isabell Spencer.

The first deed was given to Stephen T.

Gillmor on October 25, 1926 and the second to Emil Marcellin in
1931. The description to Marcellin was all the rest of the Spencer
property in that area less the portion deeded to Gillmor.

The

portion of the deed in dispute is as follows:
. . .thence West approximately 5 rods to a point
on the Easterly side of the aforesaid 6 rod
wide road and at a point 3 rods Easterly from
the center line of said road and at right
angles thereto; thence along the Easterly side
of said road and 3 rods Easterly from the
center line thereof and at right angles
thereto, Northerly and Westerly to a point 3
rods East from the Southwest corner to the
Northwest
Quarter
of
Section
28,
aforesaid;thence
West
3
rods;
thence
Northwesterly on a direct line 61 rods, more
or less, to the point of beginning.
(Emphasis added)
The Partitian Decree, goes counterclockwise. The historical deeds
go clockwise, the partitian decree states:
...thence southeasterly 1006.50 feet more or
less to the west quarter corner of said
section 28, thence east 49.50 feet, thence
southeasterly along a road to a point that is
82.50 feet west of the point of beginning,
thence east 82.50 feet to the point of
beginning. (Emphasis added)
James West testified: (R. 001372)
Q. Okay, tell me the legal description that
you use as a basis for what you surveyed?
A. I used the Partition Decree which is on
page 33 o f —
Q. You're referring to the partition decree
in the Gillmore v. Gillmore?
A. Yes.
Q. Who furnished that to you?
A. Frank and Nadine Gillmore.
Q. Did they ask you to do something when they
gave you that legal description?
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A. To identify their boundaries.
Q.
They asked you to identify boundaries
shown in the partition decree on the ground?
A. Yes
Mr. West later testified that he compared the historical deeds
and the partition decree and the description were the same in the
disputed area as follows:

(R. 1390)

Q. We.., do you have an opinion as to whether
or not the boundary line as described in this
deed I just read to you are the same or not as
the boundary lines you have depicted on your
survey?
A. It's the same.
Mr. West's interpretation and reading of the historical deed
at the point of dispute is as follows:

(R. 001370 - R. 001371)

A.
Thence along the easterly side of said
road and three rods easterly from the
centerline thereof at right angles thereto
northerly and westerly to a point three rods
east from the southwest corner of the
northwest quarter of section 28.
Q. Can you find that point three rods west of
the west quarter corner of section 28?
A. From here to here.
Q. Is that three rods, is it the 49.5 feet;
is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So it goes along the road to a point 49.5
feet east of the west quarter corner of
section 28; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Where does it go from there? Thence west
three rods?
A. West three rods, that would be back to the
quarter corner.
Q. The west quarter corner of section 28?
A. Yes.
Q. Then from there where does it go?
A. Thence northwesterly on a direct line 61
rods more or less to the point of beginning.
( R. 001390)
Q. Why do you say those are the same lines?
Is there something about this particular area
that helps you fix the location of this
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boundary?
A. Well, it calls out the quarter corner, the
west quarter corner of section 28. This has
been established and there's also evidence
that this is the section line. And the fence
to the south and fence to the north, it lines
up pretty well, and the bearings close to the
north and south as well.
West later explained why he did not use the point in the road but
rather used a call which was not either in the partition decree nor
in the historical deed. (R. 002088)
Q. All right, and
at a point three rods easterly from the center
line of said road, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q.
And at right angles thereto, is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And thence along the easterly side of said
road. Which you did, didn't you.
A. Yes.
Q. And three rods easterly from the center
thereof and at right angles thereto, northerly
and westerly.
Show me where you went
northerly and westerly?
A.
This is indicating northwesterly going
west—
Q. So you went northerly and westerly along
the road?
A. Yes.
Q. To this point?
A. To that point.
Q. and that says twelve inch CM.P.?
A. Yes.
Q. What does that stand for?
A. corrugated metal pipe.
Q.
So you stayed on the road until that
point?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you stay on the road until that
point?
A. This is what I was — what I indicated —
the section line. But with the section line
then it went — then it would have been a west
bearing.
This was on the northwest.
Somewhere I had to make a cutback to the call
in the deed to west of the quarter corner.
Q. And it was an arbitrary decision on your
34

part as to where to make the cutback and
depart from the road, wasn't it?
A. I talked to Mr. Kinghorn.
Q. And he told you where to cut off of there?
A. He said that's where he — yes.
Q.
And that's why you took off from that
point?
A. Yes.
Q. And how many turns had you made on that
road?
A. You made four or five or six turns on that
road and suddenly decided to depart from the
road.
A. I had to, yes.
Q. Now, is the road a monument?
A. Yes.
Q.
Is the three meter — is the three-rod
distance a metes-and-bounds distance call?
A. No. It's a part of it, it's — metes and
bounds say along a certain line. It's n o t —
it's just one part of the metes and bounds.
Q. Three rods is a metes and bounds, part of
the metes and bounds?
A. Part of the metes and bounds.
Q. Aren't you supposed to take the road as
the monument, stay on the road instead of
going to the three-rods measurement, the
three-rods measurement?
A. In fact it called it out, being three rods
east of the guarter corner. I have to honor
that, honor that corner. It's there for a
purpose.
Q. Is the general rule of survey that if you
have a choice you take a monument over a metes
and bounds call?
A. The metes and bounds call is for along a
fence or —
Q. I'm not asking that. Is the general rule
that you take a monument over a metes and
bounds call?
A. Yes.
Q. Is a road a natural monument?
A. Yes, it's a natural monument.
Q.
Is a guarter corner an artificial
monument?
A.
If it's a stone—if it's an original
corner.
Q. And is the rule that you take a natural
monument over an artificial monument?
A. Yes.
Q. and if the road is a natural monument,
sir, and you were on the road why didn't you
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stay on the road instead of going to a
measurement from an artificial monument?
Because Mr. Kinghorn told you do to, isn't it?
A. No. Still call it out and I would h a v e — I
looked, searched that area for the original
corner, could not find it.
Q. So you reset it?
A. No, I didn't reset it. Forsgren & Perkins
set it. They reestablished that corner.
(R. 002016)
Q. All right. Sir, this here says the most
common hierarchy of calls is as follows: one,
natural monuments; two, artificial monuments;
three, distances. Do you recognize that as a
standard
treatise
in your
industry
and
profession that correctly set forth the calls?
A. Yes, I do.
(R. 002017)
Q. All right. Now, Mr. West, this says along
the easterly side of said road and three rods
easterly from the center line thereof and at
right angles thereto. Is that correct?
A. Urn-Hum.
Q.
You're still on the road at that point,
aren't you?
A. Yes.
Q.
Northerly and westerly to a point three
rods east from the southwest corner of the
northwest quarter of section 28 aforesaid.
Now, that's the language you said justifies a
departure from the road, is that right?
A. Yes.
Mr. West testified about the decree description not closing as
follows:

(R. 001412)
A. I thought you were turned around.
Q. This call here? This call here, it is a
deed actually east 332.94 feet.
What does
that mean?
A. The deed, in the deed it calls out 82.5
fee, and to get over to the road from that
line boundary, the Boundary line, it takes 300
feet or better.
Q. From the court decree?
A. Yes.
Q. So that actually didn't close, either, did
it, if you just used the footage?
A. No.
Q.
That was the one that you in and
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corrected, gave Mr. Kinghorn a correct
description and he went in and got the court
decree changed?
A. Yes.
Frank Marcellin testified that the Old Ranch
Road had moved to the east: (R. 001971)
Q. Mr. Marcellin, I believe you said that you
were making these observations in 1 9 — some of
the observations in 1931. When were you born?
A.
I was born in 1931>
I was making the
observations in #33, '34., on up.
(R. 001467 — Born in October 1931)
(R. 001971)
Q. Okay. So in "33 when you first started
making the observations you were two year old?
A. Tow and a half year old, yes.
Q. Now, you say the road moved. Of course I
disagree with that, but when do you say the
road moved?
A. The road moved when the W.P.A. put that
in, which would be in about f34 and '35 when
they got it completed. And they only went to
the end of where the Macori Property was.
Q. And you were three-years-old when you saw
that?
A. I was four or five before they finished
it. They didn't finish it in one year.
Q. It took them two years to finish it?
A. Longer than that. It was about '35, '36
when they finish that road.
Q. Two or three years?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the old road that you say went down
west of where the road is now, when did you
observe that being used?
A. I used it when I went there to get the
milk cows out of the north pasture, as we call
it.
And at that time I was—why I say, I
started milking cows when I was three and a
half years old. I went and herded them cattle
from the field, the pasture to the milk barn.
Q. On that Old Road?
A. On that Old Road. And then it continued
on to the present Old Ranch Road as they
called i t — I call it the Marcellin Lane
because it's easier—and then on the point Mel
Flinders was saying it was rocky because it
was such a bog hole, they then cut back into
our own property, into our own barn yard.
Q. Now, as I understand it, you're saying the
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new road was finished in about 1935. Is that
correct?
A. That's the Old Ranch Road.
Q. The new Old Ranch Road?
A. Yeah.
Q. The new old ranch road was finished in "35
when you were four years old?
A. No. I was older than that.
Q. When were you born?
A. I was born in '31.
Q. In '35 how old were you?
A. I was five years old—no. four year old.
Q. Four years old. Now, when they started
using the brand new old ranch road, what did
the old ranch road or the old Marcellin Lane
look like in terms of a road on the ground?
A. Okay. That's it was, was wagon tracks
with sage brush in it.
Q. It wasn't a six-rod-wide county road?
A. No, it wasn't
Q. Do you know why the 1925 deed would say to
a six-rod-wide county road?
A. I do not.
Q. But you're saying, sir, that in 1933, when
you were two and a half, three, two and a half
and starting to milk cows, you're certain
there was no road where the new old ranch road
now is?
A.
That's when the W.P.A. started putting
that road over that crest of the hill down
into the Macori barn.
Q. And before they started putting that in
there, there was nothing there?
A. There was not sagebrush.
Q. And they started putting that there in
1934, I believe you testified?
A. Roughly around in that time, '33, '34.
Q. So it may have been 1933 when you were two
years old, is that right
A.
I'm sure that they was working on that
road prior to that.
Q. Prior t o — 1932?
A. Urn-Hum.
Q. How do you know that?
A. To get the extent of the work that they
had done they had to be there for quite
sometime.
Q. Which you were observing by the time you
were two years old?
A. I seen that when I was two. And I seen
the guys that worked on that W.P.A. crew.
Q. So by 1932 they had to have been working
38

on the road for quite sometime. What do you
say is quite sometime?
A. Possibly within that year, '32 on.
Q.
How about 1931, could they have been
working on it then?
A. I don't believe so because my mother and
dad would have surely told me if they had of.
Q. But they were working on it in 1932, is
that right?
A. Yes.
Mr. Marcellin testified at R. 001472 to the road change except he
stated:
Q. (By Mr. Kinghorn on redirect after a break)
Let me ask you to restrict your testimony to
your recollection of the WPA crew, about how
many years, what years do you recall them
working on it?
A. I remember them working there for two or
three years.
Q. Can you tell me what those years would be,
from your testimony?
A.
Roughly maybe '35, '36, '37, that era
right in there, '38.
Q. Prior to that time, Mr. Marcellin, do you
recall what the old ranch road or Marcellin
Lane looked like?
A. It was just a wagon road.
Q. Will you tell me what you mean by "wagon
road"?
How wide was it What did it look
like?
A. Well, it would be just enough for wagons
that had a rim of steel around wooden spokes
wheels with a bolster between them which, what
I would say were no more than—at the most,
they would be maybe eight feet.
Q.
This was a -you're describing the road
that had basically two tracks that were about
eight feet wide?
A. Yes.
David Moore testified: (R. 001720)
Q. If I instructed you—if I hired you and
instructed you to assume in your testimony
that there would be evidence introduced in the
trial that this fixed object, the road, had
been moved by the county to the exact, and
moved an undetermined distance at some point
in time after the deeds were written, would it
change you interpretation of this deed?
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A.
If I saw the evidence was—was able to
determine what it is, which I haven't seen;
you're asking me to give a hypothetical.
Q. That's right, I am.
A.
If the road had changed, which I don't
know that it has; it would change my opinion,
yes.
The foregoing is against the clear weight of the evidence
is set forth as follows:
Kent Wilde interprets the same description as follows:
001765)
A. Then the deed, as we've gone over this
numerous times, says that we go on the
easterly side of a six-rod wide road
northwesterly up to a point which is three
rods east of the guarter corner.
Q.
Were those inconsistent calls, in your
opinion?
A. Stating it more—you mean along the road
or until we went to this point?
Q. Until you where you got to this.
A. Yes, there was an inconsistency which we
reached at this point here.
Q. What was that?
A. The monument of the road did not coincide
with the monument of the guarter corner.
Q. How did you determine that? Did you use a
metes and bounds call of the three rods to
determine that there was not a correspondence?
A. Yes, and by physically finding a monument
that had been set in '87.
Q. Did you disregard the three rods?
A.
Where this metes and bounds was
inconsistent with monument, we used exactly
the same line of logic to come from the
easterly side of the road to the guarter
corner,
which
showed
that
it
was
approximately, or with reason, of what that
distance would have been.
Q. What was that?
A.
238 from the easterly side, not the
guarter, but from the easterly side.
Q. Was that three chains?
A. Pretty close.
Q. And again then to clarify, if you would,
why you used the east side of the road instead
of a measurement of the three rods.
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A, As I read the deed, it states that it's
tying—whoever prepared the deed, and in
following the footsteps from the very
beginning of the deed, he's specifically
states that it starts on the easterly side of
a six-rod wide road. He makes the metes and
bounds to the deed until he comes to a point
down here, which was the beginning point from
the Gillmor property to the court proceedings,
and then he ties it back to the easterly side
of six-rod wide road, which is three rods east
of the centerline of the road. Then it says
it follows that point up to a point to where
it goes west three rods east of the quarter
corner.
Q. Why do you stay on the road at the call
instead of going to a point three rods east?
A.
Mr. Klnghorn:
Objection, leading the
witness. The witness didn't say that.
Q. Did you do that?
The Court:
no, no.
I'll sustain the
objection.
Mr. Summerhays:
Withdraw it, your honor.
When you got to this point—and I would like
you write "A" on there. Did you use that as a
boundary marker on the division of the
property?
A. I did.
Q. Why?
A. Because it called for the easterly side of
the six-rod wide road.
Q. Why? did you use that instead of a threerod measurement?
A. I did.
Q. Why?
A. Two reasons: One, the original stone that
was set by the government land office, the
original indication that anyone has used that
since it was set in the late 1800's. This
monument, which was set, which was correctly
set by Mr. West in 1987 (sic), was a
proportioning measurement. Now as we review
all of the plats of the sections, and the way
they were set, we find that the GLO Plat says
that particularly section 28 is a short
section. If we find how it actually sits on
the ground, we find it's a long section. When
we establish this corner, it is off of a
double proportioning method, and that meas it
affects four measurements. Whatever the stone
is found to the east, which is the quarter
corner in this case, a mile to west, a mile to
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the north, and whatever stone was found to the
southerly
part,
this
is
a calculated
measurement to fix it in the best position
that we can.
Q. When you say "this" can you mark point as
"B"?
A. Yes.
Q. What is "B"?
A. It's the southwest corner of section 28.
Q. Thank you, go ahead.
A. Doing this proportioning method, and all
the reference books I've studied and the
classes I've attended say no way do we ever
set a proposed monument in exactly the same
spot as it was set by the original surveyor,
but it is the best method that we have to
establish where it should be.
Q. And what did you do from there?
A. So in that case, the deed was created in
1926, the historical deed, or the division of
the two properties.
And so since this
monument was not set until '87 (sic) this
physical monument here would have precedence
over this one, because it was set at a later
date.
Q. When you say "this physical monument here"
what are you referring to?
A.
The easterly side of the six-rod wide
road.
Q.
Is that what you were referring to as
taking precedence?
A. Yes.
Q. What does that take precedence over?
A. The monument that was set in '87 (sic).
(Emphasis Added).
(R. 001765)
A. It says approximately five rods.
Q. How many feet is that?
A. 82 and one half.
Q. Was it 82 and one-half feet away from that
point?
A. No.
Q. How far was it?
A. I measured 307.51 feet.
Q. How many chains is that?
A. Approximately five chains.
0. So it said "five rods," but you went five
chains?
A. No, I went to the easterly side of the
existing road.
Q. Which turned out to be what?
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A.

Approximately five chains.

Mr. West admitted that the description didn't close but unlike
Mr. Wilde he used the distance call rather than the monument which
violated a primary survey rule.
Mr. West explains his interpretation as follows: (R. 001618)
Q.
And did you hear Mr. Wilde's—the
interpretation Mr. Wilde placed on the calls
and points and distance in the deed in the
disputed territory?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you agree with his interpretation of
that deed?
A. Will you explain to the court why you do
not.
A. He says that the point where it comes up to
three rods west of the west quarter corner is
in the road, he stated in the road. If that
was the case, it would put a big
a bend in
the section line, would not be straight
through.
Q.
Do you believe there is a bend in the
section line to the east?
A. No.
David Moore testified: (R. 001681)
Mr. Summerhays: That's good. I'm going to
read from Octor v. Maw and see if we can
stipulate that that's the law of Utah.
October v. Maw— I have to get my glasses
here, you honor. This is the Supreme Court of
Utah, a 1972 case, 493 P.2d 989, citing from
page 993, a unanimous decision written by
Justice Callister:
This court has consistently adhered to the
principle that a distance call yields to the
monument call, the reason being that there is
more likelihood of mistake in courses and
distances than in calls to fixed objects which
are capable of being clearly designated and
accurately described.
Mr. Kinghorn: Your honor, that's the way our
Supreme Court—that fine. That's the law. I
stipulate to it.
Mr. Summerhays: Is that a rule you use in your
business?
A.
Yes, the physical monument takes
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precedence—or, the physical ties in a deed
take precedence over bearing and distance.
Q.
Are you familiar with the Learned
Treatise, A Guide To Understanding Land
Surveys, by Steven Estopenol?
A. Yes.
Q.
What does that say about the rule you
should follow?
A.
It says that there is a hierarchy of
monuments, the first one being—lost the word-a physical monument that is accepted as a
physical monument.
The second one is
artificial monuments.
Physical would be
things such as to a river, to a road, to
something that is physical, versus to monument
that is artificially created by a surveyor.
Q.
To refresh you memory, would it be
"natural"?
A. Thank you, natural monuments.
Q. That's the first hierarchy?
A. The first rule is you go to the natural
monument, if it isn't stated in the deed, no
matter what the bearing and distance are.
Q.
Is a road a natural or artificial
monument?
A. Natural.
Q. Why is that?
A.
They're used for long periods of time.
Once they're created, they generally don't
change
location
without
some
type of
condemnation action.
(R. 1687)
Q. Now where did Mr. West use as his point?
A. He used the west quarter corner as his tie
point and leaves the road.
Q. Measured three rods?
A. He leaves the road and measures to a point
three rods east of the west quarter corner,
and he adds in a course to ge there.
Q. That's not in the deed?
A. It's not referred to at all in the deed.
Q. Was that correct practice?
A. No.
Q. Why?
A. It's not consistent with the historical
legal description.
The historical legal
description says, you know, you're going along
the road; it doesn't say you're leaving the
road.
So this point has got to be on the
road, wherever it comes up here.
Q. That's the monuments rule?
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A. Yes, natural monument is to stay on the
road.
Q. What's the next can.'
Thence
west
three
rods,
thence
northwesterly on a direct line 61 rods more or
less to the point of beginning.
Where would that take you?
A three-rod job here and you go straight.
Now how wide is the road at this point?
six- excuse me, six-rods wide. We're on
the east side of it.
Q. If you g o — if it's six-rods wide, and » ou
go west three rods, where are you?
A
the center of the road.
Q. And t h e n you go s t r a i c n
rt~ of
beginning?
A. Yes, in a straight line.
Q. Is that where the road i s now?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Along here to this point. Here you do a
jog, and then you qo straight back to the
point of beginning.
Q
Nov where does Mr. West use as a line?
A. He's on the road to a point somewhere south
of the quarter section line and then he
intersects a line that goes to a point three
rods east of the west quarter corner.
Q. Is that a diagonal?
A. Yes.
Q. Is tha I: anywhere i n that description?
A. No.
Q. Then where does he go?
A. He goes to the west three rods, three rods
to the west quarter corner, and then he goes
on north, a straight line back to the point of
beginning.
(R
001698)
Q. What's the difference between that legal
description and the legal description—strike
that. Are all other legal descriptions in the
chain of title the same with respect to this
boundary line other than the partition decree?
A. Prior to the partition decree, they used
the same legal description, yes.
Q.
Yes. Now what's the difference between
those prior to the partition decree and the
partition decree?
A. The first difference is that it ties to a
different section corner, ties to—whoever
prepared it ties to the southwest corner
rather than the northwest corner, and it ones
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are clockwise versus counterclockwise. But it
makes—you know, the obvious difference is it
makes no reference at all in the deed to the
road.
Q. And that's the document by Gillmor got his
title?
A. Yes
Q. Now if there's no reference in the deed to
the monument, but only metes and bound
description, what is the proper way to survey
it?
A. Tying to the—you know, using a metes and
bounds legal description, and ignoring any
reference to a road, if you're relying totally
on the partition decree.
Q. Is that what Mr. West has done here?
A. In my opinion, yes.
(Plaintiff's

exhibit

one

also

contains

an

amended partition decree that was filed in May
20, 1993 which does have ties to the physical
monument the road.)
Mr. Marcellin testified that the road had moved, which in observed
when he was 2 or 2 1/2 years and that the work was completed by
the time he was 4 or 5 years old.

The following people who lived

in the area and travel the road state the road to the best of their
knowledge is in the same place now as it was in the '20's and
'30's.
Jim Sorenson who was born on January 1, 1914 (R. 001837) states:
(R. 001837)
Q. And have you been familiar with that area
since then?
A. Yes
Q.
And have you had occasion to become
familiar with old ranch road?
A. Well, I haven't used it daily, but I used
it at times daily. I hauled milk on it in
'34,'35. from the ranchers over there,
Marcellin's
Q. And were you about nine years old when you
moved up there?
A. Yes.
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Q. And have ;you been familiar with old ranch
road as it runs north and south since that
time?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you famili ar wi th where it is now?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you have an occasion about three
weeks ago to go look, at thi s again wi th Mr
Cummings?
A. Yes.
Q. And to your knowledge is the road in the
same place that it was in when you moved—
A. Yes
Q
Has it also always been in the same place?
A
Yes, sir.
(R. 001840)
Q. Was there ever a time that you remember in
the '30's when there were W.P.A. crews out
working on the Old Ranch Road?
A. Yes. i remember them working there, but
the exact date I don't know.
Q. Okay. In '34 and '35 do you recall the
condition, the size, so forth, of the road,
what is looked like? Do you remember what it
looked like?
A. We.., it's similar to what it is now, the
sides of the road. Only it was gravel then
and not paved.
o. Okay.
Was it as wide as it is now?
A. Well, the place now has been widened out,
but generally it's the same, yes,
Q. So you're saying it's about the width now
as it was in 1934 and '35
I\
yes.
The witness: Well, that—-I wouldn't know sir>
I do know where the road was all my time and I
know i t's the same as i t is now.
(R,
Q.
any
A

001843)
You don't remember the W.P.A, having made
changes in the road?
Not in a place that's in question, no.

Q. Well, I guess I wasn't to make sure you
understood the last question I asked. What I
asked you was whether or not you would recall
today if there had been some changes made by
the W.P.A. crew on the road north of
Marcellin's place. Do you think you would
remember that clearly today?
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A.

No, I wouldn't.

Frank Marcellin disagree with the testimony of the of Jim Sorensen
(R. 137) and stated that Sorenson never pick up milk there in '34
and '35 and that Sorenson was no correct that the road never moved.
Marcellin is testifying that he believed that in '38 the train
stopped running the milk and after that Al Harris picked up the
milk.

The area of time which Marcellin says in believe something

happened and the fact that Sorensen clearly stated that it was '34
and '35 when he picked up the milk because the train had stopped,
the critical time as to whether Marcellin actually remembers
whether a road moved when he was 2 1/2 years old and his memory for
the period of time when he was 3 and 4 and does remember someone
makes his ability to actually know whether the road moved or
whether his impressions of his early years on the ranch are clear
enough to make that firm stand.
Blaine Bittner testified as follows: (R. 002072)
A. When I was born on the ranch right there
in Parley's Park, and we would call it that.
I was born in 1916.
Q. You were born in the ranch?
A. I was
Q. And you grew up around Old Ranch Road?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm referring to Exhibit no. 31, which is
a section of old ranch road. This is where
the Garlick home is.
A.
I don't know. I've never heard of the
Garlick, in fact.
Q. Are you familiar with the entire Old Ranch
Road as it runs north and south?
A. We can go around there infreguently around
that way.
Q. To your knowledge, is Old Ranch road the
same it was as you were growing up?
A. It's never changed that I know of, except
when the WPA was there, why, they widened it
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in a place or two.
A. They didn't move the road?
Q. The road was never moved as fa
(R. 002074)
Q. Good. The specific area that's in dispute
here is an area down where this red mark is.
I'm going to ask you if you remember Emil
Marcellin.
/'. Yes, we were friends with Emil.
ij, do you know Frank, His son?
f\
I know Frank.
y
do you see the Marce 11 in PJ ace on the
Aerial Photo?
A.
Well, I assume that that — i t would be
down in here, wouldn't it? I can't tell from
the aerial map. I'm not familiar with it.
Q. Let me represent to you that this group of
barns and building right here is the Old
Marcellin Place right here.
A. This is Ranch Road here, then?
Q. Yes, this is Ranch Road there. And as the
road went around, do you recall the condition
of Old Ranch Road as it went past the
Marcellin Place and went north up towards you
place in about the 1930's?
A.
It's never changed
I !:: s always been
there.
Q
It's always been there. Do you remember
what it looked like in the - - - • the 20's and
30's?
The bar :i:i and the house was just below the
id a ways.
What did the road look Jike?
v.
A. Just a county road.
Q. How wide was it?
A. I couldn't say.
Q
Do you remember a time when it looked like
a couple of wagon tracks where people—
A. No, no, it was wider than that mostly.
Q. in the '30's?
A. Yes, they started coming with a grader and
so on.
Q. do you know when they started doing that?
A. I don't know; about 1925 I imagine.
Q.
Did you ever remember a WPA work crew
coming in and working on this section of Old
Ranch Road?
A. They worked on it. We gave LIKMII « - in mil
ground to kind of widen it o u t .
Q. W h y did y o u give them ground?
A. W e . . , did you give them ground?
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A.
We.., we joined up in here, we joined
Ranch Road we had a 120-acre meadow in there.
Q.
When they widened it out, did they
straighten it out a little bit so it ran
straighter?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Not that you know of. Do you know any
other work they did down here north of the
Marcellin Place/
A. No, not exactly.
Q. You don't remember any of the work?
A. No. But they put them posts in is the
main thing they did, and that was to furnish
work for the WPA.
Q. What Posts?
Q. Cedar posts.
Q. What were they marking?
A. Well, they put them in place of the Old
ones.
Q. Fence posts?
A. Fence posts.
Q. Did you see them put fence posts in along
the Marcellin Property?
A. I think they went clear along there.
Q. Do you know whether they made any changes
in the road down here around the Marcellin
Property?
A. No, no changes that I know of.
Q. Would it surprise you if I were to tell
you that Frank Marcellin recalls watching them
make changes in the road amount there place?
A. Yeah. I can't refute him because he lived
there.
Frank Marcellin on pages R. 001968 and 001969 stated that he
disagreed with Mr. Bittner that there were no fences along the road
and the road never moved.

It should be noted that Mr. Bittner

stated that the road work started around 1925 on Old Ranch Road and
he would have been nine or ten years old. This was one year prior
to the original deed to Stephen Gillmor from Charles Spencer.

It

would seem apparent that the drafter of the deed were referring to
the road that was present and that widen and up grading work on
began on.

Mr. Bittner when asked it would surprise if Frank
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of age,
David Loertscher testified: (R, 002042)
Q. Have you become familiar with the property
along the Old Ranch Road during your life?
A. Absolutely,
Q. What years diiJ '/mi become familial with
it?
ft, I went to work there at the? aqe of LH in
1925.
0. Where did you work?
A,
1 worked on what's now known as the
Buehner property. The barn's stil 1 there. We
went there to milk cows.
0
And were you familiar with the Old Ranch
Road in its entirety and length at the time?
A. That's right.
Q. Wi 1 1 you describe what kl nd of road that
was?
A.
Well, it was just more or less a road
through the sagebrush for farmers. There were
three Dairy Farmers there that had to haul
their milk to the railroad either over in
Snyderville right up in there or down
Kimbal1's Junction.
Q. When d i d you l a s t lunk «it I In- in rid?
A. This morning.
Q. And do you recall and have a recollection
of where that road was in 1925?
A
It is the same place.
(R. 002049) Mr. Kinghorn:
Thank you, your
honor.
I appreciate that.
Mr. Loertscher,
would it surprise you if I were to tell you
that Frank Marcellin recalls, as a boy,
watching a WPA crew fix that road over by his
father's place, take it out of the swamp a
little bit, move it up on the side of the
hill, and re-route it up over the side of the
hill; not very much, but just enough to get it
out of the swamp? Would that surprise you if
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i.

I told you that?
A. I don't recall that, if they did, because
I didn't go along with them. By that time I
was up on snow Summit Ranch.
Q. So you were in another part of the area?
A. Well, I was up closer to Park City.
Q.
So if they were working down there on
that, and made a slight change in the road,
you may not have been aware of it; is that
fair to say?
A. If they did, I never noticed it, because
when we would to Coalville—and in fact later
on, when I became a county commissioner up
there—we always travelled that way to go, so
I never had been aware of any changes in the
road.
(R. 002051)
Q. Mr. Loertscher, that road moved, and I
think you were referring up on top of the
road; did you mean the Old Ranch Road moved
when you said that?
A. It was still the county road.
Q.
But Old Ranch Road along the Marcellin
Place, is that what you were referring to?
A.

It's still the same road.

Of course Mr. Marcellin on page R. 132 stated that he also
disagreed with the testimony of Mr. Loertscher testified that he
was 15 in 1925 (R. 002042) when he moved to the area and would have
been in his early 20s when Mr. Marcellin who was 2 1/2 to 4 years
of age when he observed the road moving.
Mr. West has demonstrated that he made some assumptions that
were not in the deed.

If there was ever a monument showing the

location of the west quarter corner back in 1926, it apparently no
longer exist. Mr. West therefore set about to locate the corner on
his own.

Using the best and latest of surveying techniques and

instruments and using the "double proportioning method," he located
this point considerably west and a little north of where the of
where the deed description says it ought to be in relation to the
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road.

By his own admission

surveying

i s currently much

mere

precise, so it should not have come as any great surprise that his
location of the quarter corner may have differed fr oin where "it w a s
thought to have been, over 60 year prior,
001412)
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.Jftftt was cal led upon to testify as to whether or not the
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call, at the disputed point in question, was to the quarter corner
as he claimed, in the historical deeds, or whether it was along the
road, his testimony was inconsistent, but he finally admitted that
there was no support for a new call to the west quarter corner or
the west boundary line. The record at page 1410 Mr, West testified
as follows:
Q. So as far you are concerned, when you got
to the word "Northerly and Westerly," you had
to stay on the east side of the road.
A. It calls out to a point, to a point.
Q. On the road.
A. It doesn't say "on the road," it says, "to
a point 3 rods east from the section corner."
Q. But aren't you still going Northerly and
Westerly along the east side of the road 3
rods east of the center line.
A. Yes, I am.
(emphasis added)
Therefore, there is no evidence to support Mr. West for making
an extra call to divert down to the west quarter corner which
created the new boundary segment in the survey of Mr. West.
The weight of the testimony given during the trial showed that the
evidence supports that if the clear language of the deed is given
effect, the entire controversy disappears.

The property boundary

in dispute runs straight down the middle of the existing road,
which is exactly where Mr. Cummings was told that it went by Emil
Marcellin, his grantor.
The Plaintiffs Appellees tried to support Mr. West survey with
the testimony from Mr. Frank Marcellin that the road had moved,
which he observed at the age 2 1/2 years of age. The weight of the
testimony of Mr. Leortcher, Mr. Sorenson, and Mr. Bittner who were
much older when this supposed road move occurred in 1931 to 1935
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but they testified that to knowledge the road is still in the same
place now as it was then.
The creditability of the survey of Mr. West should have been
rejected based on the weight of the testimony of Mr. Wilde and Mr.
Moore and the adherance to the Standard of Surveying practices to
ignore a distance call when there is a controversy with a monument.
C.
ACQUIESCENCE
THE COURT'S RULING WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT PROVED THE ELEMENTS OF
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE AND THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE
INTRODUCED TO REFUTE THIS PROOF.
There is no evidence in the record whatsoever to contradict
Defendant Appellant Cummings' testimony that he occupied the
property up to the road since at least 1964, a period of over 20
years prior to commencement of this action.
There is also no evidence in the record to contradict the
following testimony of Defendant Appellant Cummings and numerous
other witnesses:
(1)

That Mr. Cummings had fenced off the property prior to

19 64, with the fence running parallel and close to the road.
(2)

That no one had complained about his occupancy of the

property, the fence he had constructed or his resale of the
property to others who had occupied it at any time from 1964 until
the filing of the complaint in this action.
Under these circumstances, Defendant Appellant Cummings should
not be required to marshal evidence that in the opinion of
Defendant Appellant Cummings' counsel does not exist. If any such
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evidence does exist, Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors should point to
it in their brief.
Typical of the testimony of seven witnesses provided by
Defendant Appellant Cummings is the testimony of Alan Pelton. Alan
Pelton testifies on page 16 lines 6 through line 1 on page 17 of
the 2:00 p.m. session on February 17, 1994 as follows:
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) Is the property which is
on the west of the Old Ranch Road?
A. Right
Q.
Now is the Old Ranch Road at that
location, on the east of the Marcellin
Property that you purchased, changed its
location since the year 1961?
A. No, sir.
Q. At the time you purchased the property,
was there a fence immediately to the west of
the property running—immediately west of the
road running north and south?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you describe the fence for us?
A. Well, it's a pretty normal barbed-wire
fence.
Q. Post and barb wire?
A. Right.
Q. Do you know what that fence did at the
location, what purpose it served?
A.
Well, the Marcellins had a dairy farm
there, and his cattle grazed inside that
fence.
Q. Grazed up to the road on the fence?
A. Right.
also on page 18 lines 25 through page 19 line 15:
Q.
(Mr. Kinghorn)
Do you remember and
specific conversations with Mr. Marcellin
about where the property corner was located?
A. (Mr. Pelton) Yeah, he—the fenceline of
his property line is what we understood.
Q.
Right up there.
Did you notice the
fenceline was down off the edge of the hill?
A. I don't quite understand you. Do you mean
down off the edge of the hill?
Q. Did you see up there in the corner of the
property that the fenceline and the corner
line were just down off the edge of the hill?
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A.
The fenceline ran right along the west
side of the road.
Q. How far up did it go along the road from
his farm house?
A. Where it does now.
Parley M. Neeley testified on (P.46 lines 22 through 24 and page 48
lines 9 through 18)
Q.
(Mr. Summerhays)
Did you observe any
fence going along the road when you surveyed
it?
A. (Mr. Neeley) There was a fence along the
road, Yes.
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) I'm going to have him do
that.
Mr. Neeley, did you see any other
fences outside in this field that you were
surveying that's depicted on 31 in addition to
the fence that you have drawn there?
A. No, with the possible exception of fences,
corral fences where homes are in this area.
Q. Did the fence extend across what has been
shown here as the road or right of way?
A. Yes.
Blaine Bittner testified: (page 54 lines 19 though to page 55 line
5)
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) You don't remember any of
that work?
A. No. But they put them posts in is the
main thing they did, and that was to furnish
work for the WPA.
Q. What posts?
A. Cedar posts.
Q. What were they marking?
A. Well, they put them in place of the old
ones.
Q. Fence posts?
A. Fence posts.
Q. Did you see them put fence posts in along
the Marcellin property?
A. I think they went clear along there.
Ron Hanney testified: (page 100 lines 6 through page 101 line 1)
Q.
(Mr. Kinghorn)
This old fence ran
considerably west of the road from the point
right next to the road down to where it was
57

considerably west?
A. As I remember that, the fenceline runs
pretty close to the road, but I can remember
as this amount of snow that was built up in
that would deep crushing down that fence—.
Q. The Old Fence?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that old fence, it went down and went
west of the Garlick House?
A. No, it did not. It stayed up next to the
road.
Q. I'm talking about the old fence.
A. That's what i'm talking about.
Q. What was the fence you're talking about
that went west of the Garlick House?
A.
If I said anything about west of the
Garlick house, it was—that fence, as I said
right at the very beginning, was right along
the Old Ranch Road.
Q.
My Question was: did you see another
fence, and older fence?
A. No, I did not.
Mel Flinders testified:

(R. 001575 lines 21 through R. 001576 line

Q.
(Mr. Kinghorn) Do you know where that
fence was with relationship to this stream in
this disputed area?
A. (Mr. Flinders) As I stated, yes, sir.
Q. What's your recollection of the location
of the fence between the stream and the road
along that disputed area?
A. It was as it is now.
Q.
As it is now.
Okay.
And it's your
testimony that as far as you know that's a
livestock fence to maintain and keep in
livestock?
A. Yes, sir.
Veigh Cummings testified about the fence as follows:
lines 9 through 17.)
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) Was there a fence along
the west of that road running north and south?
A. (Mr. Cummings) Yes. There has also been
fences on the west side of that road.
Q. Running north and south?
A. Yes, north and south.
Q. How far west of the road were those fences
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(R. 001581

when you were driving the milk route?
A.

Oh, 30 or 40 feet from the center line.

(R. 001587 lines 8 through 25)
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) From that year of 1961,
when you bought the property, till this
litigation was filled in 1987, December 1987,
did the Gillmors or anyone else ever come to
you and say you don't own that disputed
property?
A.
(Mr. Cummings)
No.
No one ever
questioned my ownership to that property west
of the Old Ranch Road.
Q.
And prior to your sales to those
individuals, did you occupy and use the
property up to the north-south fence on the
west of Old Ranch Road?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that the boundary line that you
assumed was the east boundary of your
property?
A. Yes. I knew it was the east line of our
property.
Q.
Did anybody ever interrupt your use of
that property?
A. No, no.
(R. 001606 lines 1 through 21)
Q. (Mr. Kinghorn) Mr. Cummings, did you ever
build any new fences on this property in the
area—I'm just going to restrict my question
to the area that's shown on exhibit 31 as
begin the area across the frontage of lot one,
and I think this is lot nine, the Garlick
property.
Did you ever have anybody build any fence
along there?
A. (Mr. Cummings) No. repaired fence, but
no new fences.
Q. Did you ever have anybody build any new
fences?
A. No, not that I know of.
Q. Specifically, you never had anybody take
down an old fence that was down around the
base of the hill there?
A.
No.
I don't recall any fences in the
area, other than fences going west.
Q. You never had any fences removed? Is that
correct?
A. No. I don't recall ever having any fences
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removed.
Veigh Cummings also testified as to events concerning the
watering of sheep which were run on the Gillmor property by Steven
T. Gillmor, Jr., who's father was the original deed holder of the
Gillmor property, cousin of Frank Gillmor, Jr., Steven T. Gillmor
died in 1988,

as follows: (R. 001525 lines 1 through R. 001526

line 6)
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) What hill?
A. (Mr. Cummings) The hill to the east of the
property that the Gillmor's owned. There was
their east side of the Old Ranch Road, of this
blue-green line.
Q. Right where your hand is?
A. Up through that area. They owned all that
ground. In fact, I even helped Steve raise
tow lower barbed wires and tie them up so his
sheep could go into the creek and back out as
an accommodation to him, at no cost. In fact,
they went down 5200 north and—.
(Kinghorn)
Objection to anything Steve
Gillmor said 30 years ago as being complete
hearsay.
The Court: I would sustain.
Q. What was, confine your testimony as to
what was done.
A. The sheep went into the creek and watered
on one occasion. They went down 5200 North
and watered down there and grazed in 5200
North, which I didn't oppose. I mean we've
got them out, no problem.
Q. Would you tell us about what you did about
the barbed wire fence.
A.
We raised two bottom wires up so they
would be high enough so the sheep could go
underneath it and travel to the creek, then
back up onto the hill and graze.
Q. You let him do that?
A. Sure.
Q. Why did you let him do that?
A. Because he was my friend.
Q. Did he ever do that when you—at anytime
except when you gave him permission?
A. No, he wouldn't do that.
Frank Marcellin is the only person to testify that the fence
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was not along the west side of the road when Cummings purchased the
property. Frank Marcellin did testify that from 1964 on, there was
a fence along the road. Frank Marcellin testified as follows: (R.
001979 afternoon session lines 2 through line 5)
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) Now, you are clear in
your mind that a fence was there along the
west of old ranch road by 1964, directly west?
A. (Mr. Marcellin) That I know, yes.
Veigh Cummings also testified: (R. 001875)
Q. (Mr. Summerhays) All right. and if the
disputed property—did the disputed property
lay partly over 5200 north?
A. (Mr. Cummings) Yes.
Q.
And When approximately was 5200 North
Built?
A. Sixty-five.
Q.
And to your knowledge was there road
traffic over that since then?
A. Ever since, yes.
Q. Have you ever heard or had any complaint
about road traffic over that road since then?
A. no.
The

leading

Supreme

Court

opinion

that

most

recently

summarizes the history of the law in Utah concerning boundary by
acquiescence is Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d 1023 (S.Ct. Utah
1991).

The elements of boundary by acquiescence as stated in

Chappell are:
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked by
monuments, fences, or buildings,
(2) Mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary,
(3) For a long period of time,
(4) By adjoining landowners.
The testimony at trial was undisputed that since Defendant
Appellant Cummings purchased the property he or his successors have
occupied up to the Old Ranch Road for twenty-seven (27) years. The
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road had always had a fence on the west side of the road congruent
to the Cummings property. The preponderance of the evidence at the
trial was always a fence on the west side of the Old Ranch Road.
Frank Marcellin even testified of the fence being there after 1964,
except for part of a year when the fence was replaced with a
different type of fencing (according to Mr. Frank Marcellin).
Cummings testified that he occupied up to the road which was
fenced.

Defendant Appellant Cummings testified that Stephen T.

Gillmor, Jr., the son of Stephen T. Gillmor, Sr., watered the sheep
he ran on the property.

Cummings also testified that no one from

the time he purchased the property until the filling of the
litigation ever disputed his ownership of this property.
The Utah courts have long recognized boundaries marked by
fences, walls, buildings, gravel driveways, cement driveways and
rivers as monuments which establish a boundary line. 1975 Utah Law
Review: 221; 226.
There is no dispute that the existing county road and the
fence on the west line of the road are sufficient visible monuments
for purposes of boundary by acguiescence.

The most credible

evidence establishes the existing road as the common boundary
beginning in 1926, the date that the portion east of the existing
road was deeded to Stephen T. Gillmor, Sr., Plaintiffs Appellees
Gillmors' predecessor, by the Spencers, the common grantors. That
was 62 years before Gillmors filed suit in October of 1987. Even
if credence were given to the testimony of Frank Marcellin, that a
portion of the road was changed somewhere between 1931 and 1935,
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this shows that the monument in existence for more than 50 years
before Gillmors filed suit in October 1987.
Cummings purchased the Marcellin ranch in 1960 taking title in
1961.

At least seven witnesses testified that a fence was along

the west side of the Old Ranch Road during the period of time when
Veigh Cummings purchased the Marcellin property.
Defendant Appellant Cummings testified that he ran cattle on
the land from the date of his acquisition in 1961 and even
subdivided part of the land in the disputed area up to the west
line of the road in 1965. (R. 001505).

In 1965, a road was built

as part of the subdivision, which was an improvement to the west,
(now called 5200 North) over which a right of way was dedicated
that included the parcel Gillmors are claiming.

Three houses and

other improvements have been erected by subsequent purchasers from
Cummings who have been in continuous occupation up to the west line
of the road to the present.
Utah

In King v. Fronk, 378 P.2d 893 (S.Ct

1963), the placing of a mortgage on the property was

considered sufficient evidence to raise an inference of occupancy.
Therefore, subdividing, building a road, granting a right of way
and selling lots should be considered paramount acts of occupancy.
Thus, there is clear and irrefutable evidence in the record that
the land up to the road has been occupied for at least 27 years
between the time that Cummings purchased the property and the date
when Gillmor's first claimed an interest in the property by filing
their complaint in October 1987. There is evidence that there was
occupancy by the Marcellins prior to 1961.
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Cummings testified that Stephen Gillmor, Jr., the son of the
Gillmors' predecessor who ran the Gillmor sheep business on the
Gillmor property, and the adjoining landowners for the time that
Cummings and his successors occupied the land, sought permission
from Cummings to cross under fences, and over the land Gillmors are
claiming, to water sheep.

In Van Dyke v. Chappell,

supra asking

permission to use the land in question was considered evidence of
acquiescence.
Mr. Kinghorn said in his closing statement:

(R. 002187 lines

19 through R. 002188 line 10)
Your honor, I want to turn quickly, while
we're here, and while I remember it, to this
point on the mutual acquiescence.
Mr.
Summerhays mentioned that Steve Gillmor had
come down and made an agreement with Mr.
Cummings to go through the fence and water his
sheep.
Your honor, Exhibit No. 2 contains the
deeds in the chain of record, and Stephen
Gillmor, according to his estate documents,
which are one of the documents in the chain of
title, Stephen Gillmor died prior to 1934, and
his estate was probated.
The only Stephen
Gillmor that owned any of this property in
dispute at any time died prior to 1934, prior
to the time Mr. Cummings ever came along or
ever testified about it.
That
physical
evidence,
that's
documentary evidence in the record. There's
no evidence in the record of Stephen Gillmor
owning one tiny piece of this proeprty from
1934 forward after Stephen T. Gillmor's estate
was probated.
Mr. Kinghorn was mistaken in this position in that Defendant
Appellant Cummings was clearly referring to Stephen T. Gillmor,
Jr., who died in 1988, not Stephen T. Gillmor, Sr., who died in
1933.

This was confusing to the Court and resulted in material
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error in the testimony. Stephen T. Gillmor, Jr., was a director of
Wool Growers and a friend of Veigh Cummings.

Stephen T. Gillmor,

Jr., was in the chain of title as is evidenced in Plaintiffs'
Exhibit

1.

Mr. Kinghorn used this statement to lessen the

credability of Defendant Appellant Cummings.
Cummings also testified that no one ever complained about the
fence, the subdivision, the houses and improvements erected by
Cummings' successors, or the 5200 North road at any time until
Gillmors filed suit.

The comments of the Supreme Court in Hobson

v. Panauitch Lake Corporation, 530 P.2d
instructive

regarding

failure

to

raise

792

(Utah 1975) are

any

objection

to

improvements:
The very reason for being of the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence or agreement is that
in the interest of preserving the peace and
good order of society the quietly resting
bones of the past, which no one seems to have
been troubled or complained about for a long
period of years, should not be unearthed for
the purpose of stirring up controversy, but
should be left in their repose.
The

other

element

of

boundary

by

acquiescence

requirement of occupancy for a long period of time.

is

the

The rule is

now well established in Utah that twenty years is generally
considered to be a sufficiently long period of time to establish
boundary line by acquiescence. Staker v. Ainsworth, 78 P.2d 417 at
420 (Utah 1990).
In the Hobson case cited above, the Supreme Court stated at
530 P.2d 795:
The question as to just what length of time is
required has been discussed a number of times.
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Particularly in the case of King v. Fronk.
Justice Henriod, speaking for the court,
pointed out that the statutory period of seven
years for establishing ownership by adverse
possession mandates the common law requisites
of open, notorious, continuos and adverse
possession, and also requires that the
property be fenced or enclosed and the taxes
be paid thereon.
But, there are no such
requisites for establishing boundary by
acquiescence. It was therein pointed out that
there is no exact time requirement; and that
it may depend upon the circumstances of the
particular case. But the opinion reaffirms
the view that there must be some substantial
long period of time and states that it is
generally
related
to
the
common
law
prescriptive period of 20 years; and only
under unusual circumstances would a lesser
period be deemed sufficient. [Emphasis added,
Footnotes deleted].
The testimony is unrefuted that Cummings occupied up to the
road and a fence running parallel to and immediately west of it for
over twenty years prior to the filing of the complaint.

The

Gillmors and their predessor did not complain to Cummings nor
assert any ownership interest in the disputed property until
October 1987.

Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. received the title to the

property in a partician decree in May of 1981.

This was his

inheritance from his father.
Therefore, it is clear that Defendant Appellant Cummings has
established title to the property by adverse possession and the
lower court's ruling to the contrary was clearly erroneous and
should be reversed with instructions to the lower court that title
to the disputed property be quieted in Defendant Apellant Cummings.
This is so clear from the record that costs and attorneys fees
should be awarded to Defendant Appellant Cummings.
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D.
EVIDENCE OF VALUE
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF THE
DISPUTED PROPERTY.
The Trial Court erred when it declined to admit Dale Jackman's
appraissal or his testimony of the value of the land in dispute.
See case cited under Issue E.

E.
OFFSET
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF AMOUNTS PAID
IN SETTLEMENT BY THE TITLE COMPANY. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN
OFFSET FOR THESE AMOUNTS.
The trial Court erred when it declined to admit evidence of
amounts paid in settlement tp Plaintiffs Appellees Gillmors by the
title company.

Utah law does not allow such a result but rather

requires two things in compensation cases.
1.)

That no party make a double payment.

2.)

Each party pay their appropriate pro rata share of the

compensation.
Cruz v. Montoya. 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983).
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40(2); 18 Am Jur 2d § 24, 25, 27.
Therefore the court should either order a new trial on the
issues or award an offset of $38,000 against the judgment.
F.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT DEFENDNAT'S EVIDENCE OF
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POSSESSION.
The court erred when it refused to allow testimony during
the trial that would prove Adverse Possession of the property by
Cuumings.

The record states as follows:

(R. 002054)

If it's in there, I think we ought to read it.
But by inference—and we omitted to restate it
here, if we did, that's an oversight, which we
should not be bound by. But I think we have
raised it by inference, and their pleadings, I
think the pleadings raise that issue. They
say that, "We've occupied the property for a
long period of time," and so in fairness and
liberality and in the construction of the
pleadings, it would certainly allow us to
raise it at this time.
And if I'm not through today—how late
are we going to continue this for? I don't
know that, but he certainly has a chance to go
illuminate the issue, and this is the only
issue before the court on that question, your
honor.
And frankly I admit I have a difficult
burden of proof, but I have the county
recorder, the county assessor coming in here
this morning ready to proffer proof regarding
who has paid the taxes and who has paid the
taxes might be the hard part.
Now it looks like that Mr. Gillmor, from
the evidence I have, and I'm making a proffer
here, has paid the taxes since 1984 when he
filed a copy of his boundary line by
acquiescence.
So that—I;m sorry, his
partition decree, the description in the
county recorder, and after that was filed in
'84, the county assessor and the county
recorder set forth in the description that was
sent out in the tax notices this disputed
strip according to the partition decree deed.
So I have to admit that since '84, Mr. Gillmor
has also paid taxes. So if I can—.
The Court: Have both of them paid it?
Mr. Summerhays: They've both paid it.
The statute says that My client has to pay all
the taxes that are paid, so I have to
establish my case by showing that my client
was the only one that paid it before 1984.
(R. 002064)
The Court:
I'm not persuaded by the
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testimony of Mr. Spriggs that he was—he or
his deputy were subpoenaed or requested
specifically to come to the testimony
concerning adverse possession.
I think it
would be surprise to Mr. Kinghorn in the case,
and I think it is raised in the issue was
pointed out in the in the initial pleadings,
but it is not raised in the answer. This is
the
first—the
court
remembers
having
discussed this, and I have been at pre-trial,
and I know at least once we discussed it and
maybe more than that in this case, but this is
the first I remember. But of course I could
easily have forgotten it.
I would readily
admit that.
But adverse possession was not anything
that was discussed at the first hearing. I
know that my decision in the first hearing did
not have anything to do with adverse
possession.
Mr. Summerhays:
Of course that was
because we hadn't put our case on.
The Court:
I understand that, but
nothing was said concerning that, and I think
for me to allow you to raise that at this time
would be prejudicial to the plaintiff's case,
that the only way I would do that is if the
case was in such a nature that he had
sufficient time to rebut anything and I don't
know where we're going as far as our evidence
today.
What I'm saying right now is that I'm
denying your request. If the case does have
to go on and on, then I would possibly
entertain a renewed motion from you as to
opening it, and we would have to take up
evidence to rebut it.
Both the witness list for the August part of the trial and the
witness list for the February trial both listed Allan Spriggs from
the recorders office and the February list also list A person from
the County Assessor office to testify.

The question of adverse

possession was not new to this case. A Summary Judgement in favor
of the Defendants was reverse and remanded by the Utah Court of
Appeals on February 22, 1991 on the issue of Adverse Possession.
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It was remanded to clear up the question of who paid all of the
taxes.
This issue was by mean no surprise to the Plaintiff and could
not have been prejudicial to them if the testimony and the issue
had been testified to during the trial to not allow it has been
prejudicial to the Defendant Appellant Veigh Cummings.
6.
SLANDER OF TITLE ON THE COUNTERCLAIM
THE DEFENDANT PROVED THE ELEMENTS OF SLANDER OF TITLE ON ITS
COUNTERCLAIM AND THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE INTRODUCED TO
REFUTE THIS PROOF.
The elements of Slander of Title are set forth in First
Security bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah
1989) as follow:
Next to be determined is whether Appellees
slandered Banberry's title. To prove slander
of title, a claimant must prove that (1)
there was a publication of a slanderous
statement disparaging claimant's title, (2)
the statement was false, (3) the statement
was made with malice, and (4) the statement
caused actual or special damages, citing Bass
v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 761 P.2d
566, 568 (Utah 1988), and cases cited therein.
The Banberry Court, Justice Hall, speaking for a unanimous
court, went on to say:
"A slanderous statement is one that is
derogatory or injurious to the legal validity
of an owner's title or to his or her right to
sell or hypothecate the property..."
The record of the court shows unrefuted evidence of all of the
elements of Slander of Title and each element will be marshalled
and the weight of the evidence shown to prove each point.
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First

element

there was

a publication

of

a

slanderous

statement disparaging claimants title.. Mr. West testified that
the first survey did not call to a road.

(R. 001426)

Q. And when you were looking at the deed from
Spencers to Gillmore, and it says at a point
three rods easterly from the centerline of
said road and at right angles thereto, along
the easterly side of said road three rods
easterly from the centerline thereof and at
right angles thereto, northerly and easterly
to a point three rods east from the southwest
corner; and that's the quarter corner, isn't
it?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that what led you to made a diagonal
straight over to that point?
A. That's the first survey I did. I didn't
call out a road, and I put that diagonal
through there.
Q. You concluded there, the first time you
drew that, you concluded that you would leave
the road from the beginning point and go
straight to that point?
A. I assumed it could have been a road there
or 82.5 feet west.
Q. So you went-you departed from the road at
this point and west straight to that line east
of the quarter corner?
A.
It didn't tell on the—say a road, it
didn't say anything.
Q.
Yes, even though is said northerly and
easterly along the orad, you just drew a
diagonal.
A. That's the first survey.
Q.
Yes, that was a logical conclusion to
make, you should draw a straight line and
depart from the road; then you concluded that
you would do it differently and you decided
that you would follow the road and depart from
the road at a different point.
Isn't you
departure from the road at the second time you
surveyed it just as invalid as you departure
from the roadway back here the first time you
surveyed it?
A. (no audible response)
Mr. West also testified (R. 001633) also stated that the first
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survey, which was recorded, that when there was no call to the road
in the original partition decree did cut across part of Cummings
lots.

This therefore would constitute a publication that was

false.
The second element is where the statement was false. West own
testimony at R. 001633 and R. 1426 that this was there was two
surveys and the first survey description did not have a description
to the road causing a straight call which then cut over property
belonging to the Cummings which was evidence by a lis pendens being
filed.
The third element is malice,

the careless act of filing a

survey with an incorrect description no parcelling with the
original historical deeds or without checking the history deeds
demonstrates malice.
The four element is actual damages.

Curtis Oberhansley

testified in the Records from 002103 through 002113 of the loss of
a sale to the Cummings for property that he was intending to
purchase but for the lis pendens and the incorrect description
which cause the lis pendens.
All of the above showed that the property owned by Veigh
Cummings was slander by the acts of the Plaintiffs.
VII.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should therefore reverse the decision of
the Third District Court, Quiet Title to the disputed strip to
Defendant Appellant Cummings, award him his costs and attorney
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fees, and direct the lower court to enter a judgement accordingly,
DATED this 10th day of November, 1994.
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS

Lowell V. Summerhays^
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